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"No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask
any man's permission when we require him to obey it. Obedience
to the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a favor."'
I. INTRODUCTION

In the classic children's tale, The Emperor'sNew Clothes,2 Hans Christian
Andersen tells the story of a King whose presumed inviolability is desecrated by a
village boy when the boy cries out, "The King has no clothes!"3 Taken in view of
the rights of an English monarch as early as the thirteenth century, the boy's
statement in Andersen's story could well have been tantamount to a treasonous
attack on the King's sovereignty. Although, by the seventeenth century, the
development of the rights and liberties of the English people were conclusive in
determining the end of "the divine right of Kings," the maxim that "the King can

I

President Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1903) quoted in JUSTIN
KAPLAN, BARTLr's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 576 (1992).
2

HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSON, EVENTYR OG HISTORIER 96-101 (1955).

The original Danish quote was as follows: >>Men han bar jo ikke noget ptl<< HANS
CHRISTIAN ANDERSON, EVENTYR O HISTORIER 100 (1955).
3

By the early 13th Century, the English King, the lord and sovereign, "was not subject to the
enforcement of the law or the judicial process." R. Brent Walton, Comment, We're No Angels: Paula
Corbin Jones v. William Jefferson Clinton, 71 TuL. L. Rnv. 897, 902 (1997) (citing Louis L. Jaffe,
Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-6 n.15 (1963)).
Furthermore, the notion that "'the King can do no wrong"' was rooted in "'the divine right of Kings."'
Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 693 n.1 (E.D. Ark. 1994), afJ'd in part,rev'd inpart, 72 F.3d 1354
(8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996), aff'd and rem'd 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997), 974
F. Supp. 712 (1997). Moreover, deeply imbedded in the aphorism that "the King can do no wrong"
was the belief that the King was incapable of doing or thinking wrong: "[H]e can never mean to do an
improper thing; in him is no folly or weakness." Id. at 693 n.1 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON TIE LAWS OF ENGLAND 246 (Chitty ed., 1855)).
4

See Jones 869 F. Supp. at 693 n.1.
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do no wrong" survived. 6 In fact, this concept of kingship persists to the present day
and grants the Queen of England an absolute immunity from personal civil suits.7
The United States inherited the rights and liberties of the English people
when the nation's Founding Fathers adopted certain concepts embodied in the
Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, Habeas Corpus, and the English Bill of Rights.8
However, no sovereign monarch reigns over the citizens of the United States;9
rather, the nation is governed by a tripartite government with the executive power
vested in a president who is subject to election at fixed terms."0 Moreover, the
United States Constitution is silent on the issue of presidential immunity" and the

Framers of the Constitution did not provide consistent authority on the matter."
Thus, the question arises: Does the President of the United States possess an
"official inviolability" that grants him absolute immunity from being sued for
personal torts in the civil courts? Alternatively, the question may be posed using
a literary allusion: Can a mere citizen cry out, "The President has no clothes!"?
In a decision that reinforces the principle of judicial review and tests the
limits of the separation of powers, the United States Supreme Court addresses the

6

This adage represents two fundamental principles: (1) any exceptionable conduct that occurs

during the course of public affairs is not to be imputed to the King; and (2) by the very nature of the
crown, the prerogative of the King cannot be exerted to do any injury to the people. See Jones, 869
F. Supp. at 693 n. 1 (citing WILLiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 246
(Chitty ed., 1855)).
See Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 693 n.1 (citing R.J. Gray, Private Wrongs ofPublic Servants, 47
CAL. L. REv. 303, 307 (1959)). The Queen's immunity is guaranteed by the Crown Proceedings Act
of 1947. See Laurie W. Beaupre, Note, Birth of a Third Immunity? PresidentBill Clinton Secures
Temporary Immunity From Trial, 36 B.C. L. REV. 725,729 (1995). Although the Queen enjoys
immunity, the Royal Monarchs of Great Britain have traditionally made themselves amenable to suit
through a Petition of Right. In this way, royal amenability to suit in England is similar to the doctrine
of sovereign immunity in the United States. See id.
7

See Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 693 n.1.
9

See Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1358 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545

(1996), affd and rem'd 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II).
10

See Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 694 n.2 (citing RussELL KIRK, TE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER

427-428 (1974)).
11

See id. at 694 (noting that the Constitution does not address the immunity question).

12

The Supreme Court noted that the historical evidence proffered by Mr. Clinton shed little

light on the issue under consideration and was largely canceled by conflicting evidence also consistent
with the underlying principles of presidential immunity. See Clinton v. Jones, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1638
(1997).
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3 Decided in the form of a
issue of presidential inviolability in Clinton v. Jones."
response to questions presented in a certioraripetition, Clinton stands for three
propositions that will have a profound effect on the "official inviolability" of the
President of the United States: (1) in all but the most exceptional circumstances, the
United States Constitution does not grant the President temporary immunity from
personal civil suits that arise out of events preceding the President's term in office;
(2) under the doctrine of separation of powers, the federal courts are not required
to suspend private civil actions against the Chief Executive until he leaves the
presidency; and (3) it is an abuse of a district court's
discretion to defer trial of a
14
private action until after the President leaves office.
The Supreme Court's holding in Clinton places a significant limitation on
the presumed inviolability of the President. The President may no longer attempt
to avoid accountability for unofficial conduct by hiding behind the constitutional
cloak of the Presidency. 6 The Court's decision in Clinton is not only a victory for
the plaintiff, but it is a triumph for the Republic as well: citizens who have been
injured by the private acts of public servants are guaranteed the right to resort to the
laws of the land for a remedy. 7 The purpose of this Comment is to explore why the
President, along with other public servants, must be subject to the laws of the land.
First, this Comment examines the derivation and scope of executive immunity.
Second, it recounts the facts and procedural history of the underlying case. Third,
it explains the rationale used by the Supreme Court in reaching its conclusion.
Fourth, it discusses the ramifications of the Court's decision and argues that the
Court properly decided the case. Finally, it concludes that in a just and ordered
society, no one should be above the law.

13

117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).

14

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1636.

15
See id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I agree with the majority that there is no automatic
temporary immunity and that the President should have to provide the District Court with a reasoned
explanation of why the immunity is needed[.]").
16

See id.

See id. at 1652 ("Like every other citizen who properly invokes that jurisdiction, [Mrs.
Jones] has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims.").
17
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW

A.

Common Law Foundationand Framers'Intent

A proper treatment of the presidential immunity at issue in Clinton must
begin with an analysis of the derivation and scope of the principle. The theoretical
underpinnings of executive immunity originate from English common law and arise
out of the sovereignty of the monarch." Although the principle of the divine right
of kings had been the rule of the land for most of England's history, the inviolability
of the King implicit in that doctrine began to erode with the signing of the Magna
Carta.19 What followed in English history was a long and bloody struggle in which
the rights and liberties of the citizenry were defined and the powers and privileges
of the throne were limited.2" Ultimately, the precepts rooted in the divine right of
Kings gave way to the conviction expressed by Lord Coke that "[t]he King ought
to be under no man, but under God and the law."2 '
Wary of a centralized executive wielding a tyrannical hand, the Framers of

the United States Constitution hotly debated the issue of the appropriate powers and

limits of the President.2 Despite their intense disagreements, the Framers were still
unified in a single proposition: the President would not be King.2 Accordingly, the
underlying presumption guiding the creation of the office of the president was that

18
19

See generally Walton, supra note 4, at 901-04.
See Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 692 (citing WILLIAM SINDLER, MAGNA CARTA: LEGEND AND

LEGACY

172 (1965)).

20

See id.at 692-93 (citing

21

Id. at 693 (quoting

22

See Walton, supra note 4, at 905-06 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 389 (Alexander

SINDLER,

supra note 19, at 169-176).

SINDLER, supra note

19, at 172).

Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("There is hardly any part of the system which could have been
attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than [the office of the president]; and there is,
perhaps, none which has been enveighed against with less candor or criticized with less judgment.")).
Some Framers, such as Delegate Roger Sherman of Connecticut, viewed the proper role of the
President as being "'nothing more than an instrument for carrying the will of the Legislature into
effect."' See Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 694 (quoting ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CONSTITuTION:
ARTICLE II, in AN AMERICAN PRIMER 121-22 (Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 1968)). Others, such as
Gouvemor Morris of Pennsylvania, believed that the President should be "'the guardian of the people,
even of the lower classes, against Legislative tyranny."' Id.
See Walton, supranote 4, at 904-905 (citing EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICEAND
POWERS 1787-1957, at 3-16 (4th ed. 1957)).
23
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'
the Chief Executive would not be above "justice."24
Eventually, the Framers
succeeded in creating a president who was later described as being "but a man,

though among the first of men; he is but a citizen, though among the first of
citizens[;] ... he ought to pay obedience to the laws of his country, and obey the
commands of its courts ofjustice." The Framers were also cognizant, though, of
the importance and necessity of unimpeded, independent branches of government.26
This nexus between the doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of

presidential immunity has led many scholars to comment that immunity is a matter
of judicial concern, rather than constitutional inquiry.27 Thus, framed properly,
presidential immunity implicitly begs the question: to what extent may the judiciary
exert authority over the "first of citizens?"2
B.

The Supreme Court's Exercise ofAuthority Over the Executive Branch

The legal development of presidential immunity in the United States is
analogous to the evolution of the monarch's sovereignty in England. 9 Despite the
Framers' repudiation of a monarchical form of government, some, such as Sir Henry
Maine, have been cited for the proposition that "the office of the [p]resident really
is the office of a King - the chief difference being that the American President is
subject to election, at fixed terms, and that the office is not hereditary."3' However,

24

See id. at 907 (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 65 (Max

Farrand ed., 1927) (remarks of George Mason)).
1 DAVID ROBERTSON, TRIAL OF AARON BURR FOR TREASON 137 (James Cockcroft & Co.
1875) (quoting United States Attorney George Hay, responding to the Supreme Court on behalf of
President Thomas Jefferson regarding a motion to produce papers during the Aaron Burr treason trial)
quoted in Walton, supra note 4, at 905.

25

26

See Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 695 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (citing THE FEDERALIST No.

51 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996), affd and rem'd 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997), 974 F. Supp. 712
(1997).
27

See Walton, supra note 4, at 932 (citing GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, JR., THE PRESIDENCY IN

THE COURTS 318-19 (1957)).
28

See id.at 905.

29

See Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 696.

30

Id. at 694 n.2 (quoting RUSSELL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 427-428 (1974)).
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the United States Supreme Court, in Marbury v. Madison,3 1 announced its
prerogative, under the doctrine of judicial review, to review and set aside the
unlawful acts of the legislative and executive branches.32
In Marbury,the Senate had approved President John Adams's nomination
of William Marbury as ajustice of the peace.3 Accordingly, the commission was
signed by the President and the official seal was affixed by the Secretary of State.34
Before the commission was delivered, however, President Adams left office and the
new Secretary of State, James Madison, refused to deliver the commission. 5
Consequently, Marbury sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court
compelling the Secretary to deliver the commission.36 Chief Justice Marshall held
that Marbury had a constitutional right to receive his commission and stated that
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury[;] [o]ne of the
'
first duties of government is to afford that protection."37
Although the Court in
Marbury did not specifically address the issue of presidential immunity, the
decision of that case was pivotal in establishing that the executive branch was not
immune from the actions of the judicial branch in enforcing the supreme law of the
land. 8
In UnitedStates v. Burr,39 however, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that
the President may be immune to judicial authority if the exercise of that authority
31

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

32

See Walton, supranote 4, at 924-25 ("In one fell swoop Chief Justice Marshall exerted the

Court's total authority over the President whenever his acts interfere with the legal rights of others.")

(citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
33

See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 155.

34

See id.

35

See id.

36

See id. at 153-54.

Id. at 163. The Court went on to note that "[i]n Great Britain the king himself is sued in the
respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court." IdSee also
37

supra note 5.

See Jones, 869 F. Supp. 690, 696 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803)), affd in part, rev'd in part, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
38

2545 (1996).
39

25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
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interfered with the performance of the President's duties.4 ° Burr arose out of the
criminal prosecution of Aaron Burr for treason.4 1 At issue was whether a court
could serve process on the President.42 The court had issued a subpoena duces
tecum directing President Jefferson to turn over certain letters deemed to be material
to Burr's defense.43 President Jefferson refused, claiming that any exercise of
judicial authority over the President impinged on the independence 44of the office of
the president, thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine:
The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of
the Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are
more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be
independent of the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands
of the latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several
courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him constantly
trudging from north to south & east to west, and withdraw him
entirely from his constitutional duties?45
The Court in Burr held that even though the President, as a citizen, is
subject to judicial authority, he is a unique citizen who is singly responsible to the
general public.46 Writing for the court, Chief Justice Marshall stated that "[iff, upon
any principle, the [P]resident could be construed to stand exempt from the general
provisions of the [C]onstitution, it would be, because his duties as chief magistrate

40

See Joseph K. Jeffery, Note, TemporaryPresidentialImmunity: Adhering to the Separation

of PowersDoctrine andthe Will of the Framersfor Civil Damages LitigationInvolving the President
- The Jones v. Clinton Case, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 833, 854 (1996) (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. at 34).
41

See generally Burr,25 F. Cas. 30.

42

See id.

43

See id. at31.

44

Jeffery, supra note 40, at

853 (citing

WILLIAM M. GOLDSMITH, THE GROWTH OF

PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A DocumENTED HISTORY 542 (1974)).
Id. at 853-54 (quoting Thomas Jefferson in WILLIAM M. GOLDSMITH, THE GROWTH OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A DOCUMENT HISTORY 542 (1974)).
45

46

See Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191-92 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
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demand his whole time from national objects." 7 Therefore, the President may
present sufficient motives in refusing to comply with a judicial order.!8
The Court examined the nature of such motives in Mississippiv. Johnson.49
In Johnson,the state of Mississippi sued to enjoin President Andrew Johnson from
enforcing the Congressional enactments collectively known as the Reconstruction
Acts. 0 Arguing in support of President Johnson, Attorney General Stanbery urged
that the President is completely immune from the jurisdiction of any court:
There is only one court or quasi court that he can be called upon to
answer to for any dereliction of duty, for doing anything that is
contrary to law or failing to do anything which is according to law,
and that is not this tribunal but one that sits in another chamber of
this Capitol. There he can be called and tried and punished, but
not here while he is President; and after he has been dealt with in
that chamber and stripped of the robes of office, and he no longer
stands as the representative of the government, then for any wrong
he has done to any individual, for any murder or any crime of any
sort which he has committed as President, then and not till then can
he be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts. Then it is the
individual they deal with, not the representative of the people."s

Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
48

See Burr,25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).

71 U.S. (4 Wall) 475 (1866). The Supreme Court's first opportunity to address presidential
immunity occurred in Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411). Although
the action was subsequently dismissed because of a lack ofjurisdiction, the decision is deemed to be
significant in that "Chief Justice Marshall failed to address or mention any problem in suing a president
49

for actions taken while in office." Walton, supra note 4, at 927 (citing Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F.
Cas. at 663-665 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411)).
50

See Johnson, 71

U.S. (4 Wall) at 475.

Id. at 484-85 quoted in Glenn T. Williams, Note and Comment, Temporary Immunity:
DistinguishingCaseLaw Opinionson Executive Immunity andPrivilege as the Supreme Court Tackles
an Oxymoron, 21 NOVA L. REV. 969, 974 (1997).
51
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The Court in Johnson did not decide the case in favor of either party.52 Instead, the
Johnson Court held that the judiciary, under the separation of powers doctrine,
could not enjoin the President from faithfully executing his constitutional duties
without encroaching upon the independence of the executive branch.5
54
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the action on non-justiciability grounds.
In reaching its decision, the Court in Johnson made a distinction between
a ministerial and an executive act; the former involves legal duties, and hence, no
discretion, while the latter involves political functions with broad discretion.5 5
Chief Justice Chase concluded that "the duty of the President in the exercise of the
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed . . . is in no just sense
'
ministerial[;] [i]t is purely executive and political."56
(Consequently, many
commentators feel that Johnson stands for the proposition that "'the President is
immune from legal process when performing what he deems to be his constitutional
duties."' 57 ) The significance of this distinction was demonstrated just one year
later, in Gaines v. Thompson.58 The Court in Gaines found that it was
impermissible for any court to issue an order preventing or compelling the exercise
of executive discretion.59 In reaching its conclusion, the Court in Gaines relied
upon the holding in Marbury:

52
See id. at 500. The Johnson Court was operating under precarious circumstances - a
"penultimate catch-22": "[I]f the Court enjoined the President from enforcing the allegedly illegal

Reconstruction Amendments, the President might refuse to obey the Court, but if the President
complied with an injunction, popular and congressional will would be unilaterally usurped by a
counter-majoritarian Court." Walton, supra note 4, at 929-30.
53

See Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) at 500-01 cited in Walton, supra note 4, at 929.

See id. at 501 ("[We] are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin
the President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by
US.").
54

55

Walton, supra note 4, at 930-31 (citing Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 497-501).

56

Johnson, 71 U.S. at 499. See also Williams, supra note 51, at 974.

57

Williams, supra note 51, at 974-75 (quoting JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD
§ 7.1, at 235 (5th ed. 1995)).

ROTUNDA,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

s9

74 U.S. (7 Wall) 347 (1868).

59

Walton, supranote 4, at 931-32 (citing Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347, 349-50

(1868)).
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[T]he President is invested with certain political powers, in the
exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and for which he
is accountable only to his country and his conscience ....
[H]owever, that where an officer is required by law to perform an
act, not of this political or executive character, which affects the
private rights of individuals, he is to that extent amenable to the
courts.60
This truism, announced in Marbury and relied upon in Gaines, found its
proper place in United States v. Lee.6' Lee involved the transfer of a significant
amount of land known as Arlington estate from George Lee to his daughter, the wife
of General Robert E. Lee, for life.62 The land came into the possession of the
United States after purchasing the land at a tax sale.63 The tax commissioners
charged with the disposition of the land were under orders from the Secretary of
War to set aside part of the land as a national cemetery for military personnel
(Arlington National Cemetery).! The Attorney General relied upon the principle
of executive immunity in arguing that the courts lacked jurisdiction in the matter.65
Supreme Court Justice Samuel F. Miller rejected the Attorney General's claim of
immunity stating as follows:
[N]o man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No
officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All
the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.... [A court's] power
and influence rest[s] solely upon the public sense of the necessity
for the existence of a tribunal to which all may appeal for the
assertion and protection of rights guaranteed by the Constitution
and by the laws of the land.... 66

60

Gaines, 74 U.S. at 349-50.

61

106 U.S. 196 (1882).

62

See id. at 197-99.

63

See id.

64

See id. at 198.

65

See id.

66

Id. at 220, 223 cited in Williams, supra note 51, at 975-76.
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Perhaps the most significant exercise of judicial authority over the
executive branch occurred in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.6 7 At issue
in Youngstown was whether the judiciary could issue a preliminary injunction
against a cabinet official, thereby preventing him from implementing an executive
order.6" Youngstown arose out of the events surrounding the military build-up
during the Korean War.69 On April 4, 1952, after negotiations over wage increases
failed, the United Steelworkers of America gave notice that a labor strike of the
nation's steelworkers was imminent!' President Harry S Truman viewed the
pending strike as a threat to the national defense because steel was an indispensable
component in the manufacture of weapons.7'
Within hours of the scheduled strike, President Truman issued an executive
order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize control of the nation's steel
' Youngstown Sheet
mills in order to "assure the continued availability of steel."72
& Tube Co., one of the mills seized by Commerce Secretary Charles Sawyer, sued
to enjoin the secretary from carrying out the President's order! 3 The district court
issued the injunction thereby restraining the secretary from "continuing the seizure
and possession of the plant... and from acting under the purported authority of
Executive Order 10340." On the same day, the court of appeals stayed the district

67

343 U.S. 579 (1952).

68

See id.

69

See DANIEL A. FARBER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD

927 (1993). After North Korea's attack on South Korea in June 1950, the United States
Congress joined the United Nations-sanctioned peacekeeping force with a build up of American troops
in excess of 3,500,000 people along with appropriating an unprecedented sum of money for national
defense. Id.
CENTURY

70

See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583.

71

See id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 584 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C

1952)).
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court's injunction75 and the Supreme Court promptly granted certiorarito decide

the matter.76
In support of the President, the government relied upon the Supreme
Court's holding in Mississippi v. Johnson77 for the proposition that the judiciary
lacked the authority to exert control over the executive branch.78 In fact, the
government went so far as to suggest that there are only two checks on executive
conduct: the ballot box and impeachment.79 Finding that the President lacked both
congressional and constitutional authority to seize the nation's steel mills, the Court
held that "'officers of the Executive Branch ...may be enjoined when[ever] their
conduct by statute, exceeds the scope of constitutional authority, or is pursuant to
an unconstitutional enactment.""'8
The Court's decision in Youngstown is

significant in demonstrating that the judiciary may exert extraordinary authority
over the President in reviewing executive conduct that is potentially violative of the

Constitution."

75

See Sawyer v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 197 F.2d. 582 (D.C. Cir. 1952).

76

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 937 (1952).

77

See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.

78

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 576 (D.D.C. 1952), affd,

343 U.S. 579 (1952) cited in Walton, supra note 4, at 932-33.
See THE STEEL SEIZURE CAsE, H.R Doc. No. 534, pt. I, at 371 (1952) cited in Walton, supra
note 4, at 933.
79

80

Id. at 377 (1952) citedin Walton, supra note 4, at 933.

81

See Walton, supra note 4, at 933-34.
Youngstown leaves little doubt that one may challenge a President's act in a court
of law even though that order is purely executive in nature. Even the Youngstown
dissenters found that Sawyer, a member of the President's cabinet and the
President's actor and "alter ego," was not immune from judicial oversight. In so
determining, the Court effectively ruled that the President is constrained by the
supreme law of the land embodied in the Constitution. Thus, even seemingly
discretionary acts of the President that were once thought unreviewable under
Mississippiv. Johnson might be subject to substantive judicial oversight if the act
is in violation of the Constitution.
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The Doctrine ofExecutive Immunity

The political power struggles that occurred in the early English system
between Parliament and the Crown were fresh and well entrenched in the minds of
the Framers of the United States Constitution. 2 As a result, the Founding Fathers

afforded the legislative branch immunity in order to "'prevent intimidation by the
executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary...."' 3 However,
the Framers did not provide immunity for either the judicial or executive branches;
rather, the evolution of the principles ofjudicial and executive immunity were left
to common-law development.84
1.

Absolute Immunity

The United States Supreme Court first granted absolute immunity to the

judiciary in 1871.85 Justification for such immunity was grounded in the belief that
a judge "should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with
litigation charging malice or corruption[;] [i]mposing such a burden on judges
would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to
intimidation."86 This rationale formed the basis for extending immunity to the
executive branch and was embodied in two public policy principles: (1) It is unjust,
particularly in the absence of bad faith, to subject an executive officer to liability
where he is legally obligated to exercise discretion; and (2) Subjecting an executive

82

See Michael T. Matraia, Note, Runningfor Cover Behind PresidentialImmunity: The Oval

Office As Safe Haven From Civil Suits, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 195, 202-203 (1995).
83

Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966)). Article I, Section Six of

the United States Constitution sets forth the Speech and Debate Clause and the Arrest Clause:
The Senators and Representatives... in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other Place.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cI. 1. Legislative immunity was later extended to include legislative aides. See
United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
84

See Matraia supranote 82, at 203. Executive immunity is not supported by "positive law."

Id. at 203 n.44 (citing GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, JR., THE PRESIDENCY IN THE COURTS 318 (1957)).
85

See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) (holding that judges must have absolute

immunity to prevent their offices from being "degraded" and their "usefulness destroyed").
86

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
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officer threatens to deter the official's willingness to "execute his office with the
decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.""7

In 1896, the Supreme Court extended the cloak of absolute immunity to
high-ranking, cabinet officials in the executive branch in order to ensure the
"effective functioning of government." ' In so doing, the Court noted that executive
officials "should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control [their]

official conduct may at any time become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages;" to hold otherwise would "seriously cripple the proper and effective
administration of public affairs as [e]ntrusted to the executive branch of the
government[.]"8 9 Accordingly, cabinet members enjoyed absolute immunity for
87
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974). Serving as a backdrop to the first public
policy statement is the notion that "without such protection qualified persons will not seek public
office for fear of civil liability." Jeffery, supra note 40, at 839.
88

See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). In Spalding,Justice Harlan recognized the need

to afford to the executive branch the same level of immunity enjoyed by the judiciary:
We are of [the] opinion that the same general considerations of public policy and
convenience which demand for judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity
from civil suits for damages arising from acts done by them in the course of the
performance of their judicial functions apply, to a large extent, to official
communication made by heads of executive departments when engaged in the
discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. The interests of the people require
that due protection be accorded to them in respect of their official acts.
Id. at 498.
89

Id. Judge Learned Hand elaborated on this theme:

It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his
powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not
connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may
so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the
guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is
that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has
been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching
discharge of their duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action
which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official
may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy ajury of his good faith. There must
indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties;
but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been honestly
mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. As is so often the
case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either
alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try
to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
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conduct within the scope of their discretion;" acts which were "manifestly or
palpably" beyond the officials' authority were exempt from protection 9 ' This level
of immunity was later extended to protect the discretionary acts of lower level
executive officials as well.92
Over the years, the federal courts have liberally construed the doctrine of
absolute immunity to include protection for "malicious actions.., deemed to be
within the 'outer perimeter' of the federal duty." 3 Consequently, absolute
immunity operated to "permanently bar a plaintiffs civil damages claim regardless
of the official's underlying motive.9 4 However, despite the Supreme Court's broad
application of executive immunity, the Court has unequivocally maintained that
immunity
is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of
a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government
.... It is not the title of [the] office but the duties with which the
particular officer... is entrusted... which provide the guide in
delineating the scope of the rule which clothes official acts of the
executive officer with immunity .... 9'
2.

Qualified Immunity

During the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the absolute immunity
enjoyed by executive officials began to erode under a deluge of cases alleging

90

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 132, at 1060

(5th ed. 1984).
91

See Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498.

See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). In extending absolute immunity to executive
officials generally, the court recognized a third public policy goal: the fear that damage suits would
"consume time and energies which would otherwise be devoted to government service." Id. at 571.
Mr. Clinton relied on this policy argument to justify the extension of immunity to protect the unofficial
acts of the President. See Williams, supra note 51, at 979.
92

93

See KEETON, supra note 90, at 1060.

94

Id.

William F. Allen, Note, President Clinton's Claim of Temporary Immunity:
Constitutionalismin the Air, 11 J.L. & Pol. 555, 565 (1995) (quoting Barr,360 U.S. at 573-75).

95
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violations of constitutional rights

6

In an attempt to limit the harsh consequences

of granting absolute immunity, the United States Supreme Court developed the

doctrine of qualified immunity? 7 Holding that the judiciary must provide a legal
remedy for the violation of constitutional rights, the Supreme Court first stripped
low-level, federal executive officials of absolute immunity in 1971 ?" Three years
later, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,99 the Court used the new doctrine to divest Ohio's
governor of absolute immunity for violating constitutional rights when he allegedly
recklessly deployed the National Guard to quell an anti-war protest at Kent State
University."' Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger stated:
[W]hen a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative

of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case
stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected
in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The
State has no power to impart to him any immunity from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." '
Under Scheuer, qualified immunity was available only if the executive
official had a good faith belief that he was acting "within the outer perimeter" of his
duty and if he reasonably believed that his actions were lawful."2 The Court's
96

See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (holding that absolute immunity extends

only to a prosecutor's official functions); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (holding that,
because "ft]he common law has never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity,"
police officers are afforded only a qualified immunity in lawsuits alleging constitutional violations).
97

See Jennifer L. Long, Note, How to Sue the President: A Proposalfor Legislation

Establishingthe Extent of PresidentialImmunity, 30 VAt. U.L. REV. 283, 300 (1995).
98

See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed, Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971) (holding that federal executive officials could be held accountable for violating constitutional
rights).
99

416 U.S. 232 (1974).

100

See Scheuer,416 U.S. at 232.

101

Id. at 237 (citations omitted).

102

See id. at 247. Because this test caused much confusion in the lower courts, the Supreme

Court later modified the qualified immunity analysis to include both an objective and subjective
element: (1) the official must have acted without malice, and (2) the official must have had a
reasonable belief the he acted within the law. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). However,
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reasoning in Scheuer was extended to high-ranking, cabinet members in Butz v.
Economou" and finally to the President himself in Halperin v. Kissinger.'4 In
justifying this extension, Justice White argued that "[t]o create a system in which
the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does
that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head .... ,,105 By
1982, qualified immunity analysis had been improved to ascertain simply whether
the executive official seeking immunity violated clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights and whether a reasonable official would have known that the
rights existed."' The Supreme Court's creation and subsequent development of the
doctrine of qualified immunity "illustrates its desire to balance the needs 0 of
7
government officials with the constitutional rights of the people they govern."'
D.

Absolute Immunity for the President:Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Although the Supreme Court had generally recognized the President's
immunity from lawsuits arising out of his official conduct, the Court did not
expressly grant the President absolute immunity for such conduct until its 1982
decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.'8 The facts of Fitzgeraldare that the plaintiff, A.
Ernest Fitzgerald, was fired from his governmental position for allegedly

the subjective element in Wood raised factual issues, thereby making it difficult to dispose of such

claims on summary judgment. Therefore, the element was later discarded by the Court in the interest
ofjudicial economy. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 801 (1992). Consequently, the test for

qualified immunity simply became "whether the official violated an individual's clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights and whether a reasonable official would have known that the right
existed." Matraia, supra note 82, at 212.

438 U.S. 478 (1978) (holding, as a general rule, that executive officials charged with
constitutional violations are liable for their conduct).
103

104
452 U.S. 713 (1981) (affirming, per curiam, that the President of the United States could
incur civil liability for constitutional violations).

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504-05 (1978). In Butz, the Supreme Court recognized
a "second tier" for certain officials "whose special functions require a full exemption from liability."
Id. at 508. This exemption would confer absolute immunity on those executive officials who could
demonstrate that "public policy requires an exemption of [a] scope" that includes constitutional
105

violations. Id. at 506.
106

See Matraia, supra note 82, at 212.

107

Id. at 213.

Jos

457 U.S. 731 (1982).
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embarrassing both President Nixon and the Pentagon by giving congressional
testimony on cost overruns." 9 Mr. Fitzgerald filed a civil lawsuit for damages
against the President."' In turn, President Nixon moved for summary judgment
asserting that he was immune from such action."'
Prior to the Court's decision in Fitzgerald,it had been theoretically possible
to sue the President for civil damages arising out of his official conduct."' In
Fitzgerald,however, the Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that in light of the
unique constitutional nature of the office and function of the President, absolute
immunity exists from liability for acts within the "outer perimeter" of the
President's official responsibility."' The Court viewed this extraordinary level of
immunity as being manifestly rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers and
serving as a functional mandate "incident [to] the President's unique office."'" 4 The
Court reasoned that because the President "occupies a unique position in the
constitutional scheme[,] . . . diversion of his energies by concern with private
' 5
lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government.
The Court did not, however, define the contours of the "outer limits" of
Presidential authority;
rather, the Court left this issue to be addressed on a case-by6
case basis.1
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

William Jefferson Clinton, then Governor of Arkansas, the petitioner in the
Clinton decision and a co-defendant in the underlying lawsuit, delivered a speech
at an official conference held on May 8, 1991, at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock,

109

See Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 734.

110

See id. at 740.

III
See id. The district court originally rejected President Nixon's grant of immunity and the
court of appeals affirmed the decision; however, the Supreme Court, on a writ of certiorari,reversed
the lower court's decision. Id.
112

See Walton, supra note 4, at 935.

13

See Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 731.

14

Id. at 749. See also Walton, supra note 4, at 935-36.

15

Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 749-51.

116

See id. at 756-57. See also Walton, supra note 4, at 935.
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Arkansas."' Paula Corbin Jones, the respondent in Clinton and the plaintiff in the
underlying lawsuit, was working as a state employee at the time and was assigned
to staff the registration desk at the conference."' State Trooper Danny Ferguson,
a member of the governor's security detail and also a co-defendant in the underlying
lawsuit, allegedly persuaded Mrs. Jones to meet the Governor in a hotel suite., 9
Once there, Mr. Clinton allegedly made an "abhorrent" sexual proposition to which
Mrs. Jones vehemently rejected. 2 Afterwards, Mrs. Jones claimed that her
employers punished her and dealt with her in a "hostile and rude manner" for
rejecting Mr. Clinton's sexual overtures.12 ' In addition, Mr. Ferguson purportedly

contributed to an article in The American Spectator" that implied that a woman by
the name of "Paula" had succumbed to Mr. Clinton's sexual advances." Moreover,
after Mr. Clinton had been elected president in 1992, Mrs. Jones claimed that
various people, speaking on the President's behalf, publicly branded her a liar by
denying that the sexual misconduct ever occurred.

On May 6, 1994, Mrs. Jones filed a civil action for damages against
President Clinton and Trooper Ferguson in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas."2 The complaint alleged the following violations of

117

See Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1640 (1997).

118

See id. at 1640.

119

See id.

120
See id. (citing Complaint at 26, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290, 1998 WL 148370
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 1, 1998)) (hereinafter Complaint).

121

See id.

122

David Brock, Living With the Clintons,THE AMERICAN

123

See Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (referring to Complaint

SPECTATOR,

Jan. 1994, at 18.
41-

47), affd inpart,rev'd in part, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.), cert. granted,116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996), affd,
117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
124

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1640. In fact, both the White House and those close to Mr. Clinton

continued this strategy of denial long after Mrs. Jones filed her civil action. For instance, former
presidential advisor, now political consultant, James Carville described Paula Jones's complaint against
Mr. Clinton as "tabloid trash" and stated the following: "'Drag a hundred dollars through a trailer park
and there's no telling what you'll find."' Kevin Merida, PaulaJones's Attorney Sees Public Opinion,
Coverage Shifting, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at A20.
125
See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1639-40 n.1 (explaining that jurisdiction was based upon 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, & 1343 (1993)).
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state and federal law: (1) deprivation of constitutional rights and privileges;'26 (2)
conspiracy to deprive persons of equal protection of the laws; 2 7 (3) intentional
infliction of emotional distress;' and (4) defamation of character.' Although she
sought $75,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive damages, 3 Mrs. Jones
stated both publicly and in her brief that the action was commenced in an attempt
to clear her name of the reported sexual liaison.'
While Mr. Ferguson denied any questionable conduct on his part, Mr.
Clinton moved the district court to bifurcate the briefing schedule so as to permit
him to file a motion to dismiss based upon presidential immunity before any other
questions were presented.' Consequently, the court granted Mr. Clinton's motion
for bifurcation, thereby allowing him to assert presidential immunity as a basis for
dismissal."3 Until the question of presidential immunity was resolved, all other
motions or pleadings were deferred.'35 Mr. Clinton subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss the action without prejudice and to toll the applicable statute of limitations
until the completion of his term.'3 6
In Jones v. Clinton,'37 the district court denied Mr. Clinton's motion to
dismiss stating that the President was not entitled to absolute immunity from private

126

See id. at 1640 (referring to violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).

127

See id. (referring to violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1994)).

128

See id. (referring to a state common law claim).

129

See id. (referring to a state common law claim).

130

See Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1640 (1997).

See Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D. Ark. 1994), affd inpart,rev'd in part,
72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
131

132

See id. at 691.

133

See id.at 692 (referring to Jones v. Clinton, 858 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Ark. 1994)).

134

See id. at 691-92.

135

See id. at 692 (referring to Jones v. Clinton, 858 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Ark. 1994)).

136

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1639-40 (noting that President Clinton's term of office expires on

January 20, 2001).
137
869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994), afpd inpart,rev'd inpart,72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
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civil actions.138 However, the court did determine that the President was entitled to
"limited or temporary immunity" from trial! 9 The discovery process, though, was
allowed to continue as to all parties, includirig the President. 140 Mr. Clinton
appealed the court's denial
of his motion to dismiss and its decision to allow
141

discovery to continue.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Jones v. Clinton,4 4 affirmed the
district court's denial of Mr. Clinton's motion to dismiss holding that he was not
constitutionally entitled to immunity. 43 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit reversed
the district court's decision to postpone the trial, stating that the order was the
"functional equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity! 44 The court further
admonished that the district court was "duty bound" to protect the President's
ability to perform his constitutional duties by exercising its discretion in the
scheduling of civil proceedings. 4 Subsequently, Mr. Clinton filed a petition in the
United States Supreme Court for grant of a writ of certiorari.46 The Solicitor

138

See id. at 699.

See id. at 699-700 (holding that the allegations against Ferguson were so intertwined with
the allegations against Clinton that the two could not proceed piecemeal).
139

140

See id. at 699.

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1641. There were other appeals as well. After the district court
denied the President's motion to dismiss, Mr. Clinton sought to stay all proceedings pending an appeal
of the district court's order denying his motion. See id (citing Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (1996)).
Consequently, the court granted Clinton's motion to postpone the trial until the resolution of his
appeal. See id (referring to Jones v. Clinton, 879 F. Supp. 86 (1995)). At this point, the court also
granted a stay of the proceedings against Trooper Ferguson. Mrs. Jones cross-appealed this
determination in an effort to have the stays lifted. At the same time, Mr. Clinton challenged the
jurisdiction of the court to hear Mrs. Jones's appeal. Upon reaching the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, Judge Bowman dismissed as moot the district court's post-judgment order staying discovery
during the pendency of the appeal. In addition, the Eighth Circuit determined that Mr. Clinton's
challenge to the court's authority to hear Mrs. Jones's appeal was moot as well. Therefore, both
appeals were ultimately dismissed. See id. at 1640-43.
141

142

72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).

143

See Jones, 72 F.3d at 1363 (affirming the district court's decision to allow discovery to

proceed).
144

See id. at 1354.

145

See id at 1361-62.

146

See Clinton v. Jones, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).
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General of the United States supported Mr. Clinton's petition arguing that the
decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was "fundamentally mistaken" and
created "serious risks for the institution of the Presidency. 1 ' 4 7 The Supreme Court
granted the petition in which the following questions were presented:
1. Whether the litigation of a private civil damages action against
an incumbent President must in all but the most exceptional cases
be deferred until the President leaves office; and 2. Whether a

district court, as a proper exercise ofjudicial discretion, may stay
such litigation until the President leaves office."'
IV. THE DECISION

Of the many functions with which the United States Supreme Court is
charged, perhaps the most imperative to the survival of the Republic is to say what
the law is. 49 The Clinton decision concerned a matter that was properly within the
Supreme Court's province to decide cases and controversies. 5 ' Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A.

Question One: CanA King Run Naked?

In responding to the first question presented in Mr. Clinton's petition, the
Supreme Court was primarily charged with the task of determining whether a sitting
president is immune from a private civil action for damages where the underlying

See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at § 5, Clinton v. Jones,
117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997) (No. 95-1853) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. In opposition to the
President's petition for certiorari,Ms. Jones argued that the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction would
be inappropriate because it did not create any conflict among the courts of appeals, it did not pose a
threat to the executive branch, and it was not supported by precedent. See Brief in Opposition §§ 8,
10,23.
147

148

Clinton, 117 S.Ct. at 1642 n.12 (internal quotations omitted).

See Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D. Ark. 1994), affd in part,rev'd in part,
72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 2545 (1996), affd and rem'd 117 S.Ct. 1636
(1997), 974 F. Supp. 712 (1997) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
149

150

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also Clinton, 117 S.Ct. at 1648 ("[Ms. Jones] is merely asking

the courts to exercise their core Article IIIjurisdiction to decide cases and controversies[;] [w]hatever
the outcome of this case, there is no possibility that the decision will curtail the scope of the official
powers of the Executive Branch.").
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conduct occurred before the President was elected and assumed office.'

Mr.

Clinton asserted that "in all but the most exceptional case[s]," the Constitution
grants the President temporary immunity from such actions.5
1.

The King Cannot Use Precedent As A Corset

The Court in Clinton began by dismissing the possibility that the corpus of
Mr. Clinton's contention was supported by precedent.'
Essentially, Mr. Clinton
514
had asserted that immunity was manifest in the very nature of the presidency.'

Justice Stevens prefaced his analysis by noting that in the entire history of the
United States, only three Presidents had been named as defendants in civil suits that
involved their private actions which occurred before taking office.'
However,
because all of the cases were either dismissed or settled before the issue of

presidential immunity could be addressed, these cases were not instructive on the
constitutional issues before the Court.'56 Therefore, to determine whether precedent
supported Mr. Clinton's argument, the Court examined the following cases to
ascertain the purpose and proper application of the principle of executive immunity:
Ferriv. Ackerman, 57 Nixon v. Fitzgerald,5 ' and Forresterv. White.'59

151

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1643.

152

See Brief for Petitioner at i.

153

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1643.

154

See id.

155

See id.

156

See id. The Court explained that actions against Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Harry

Truman were dismissed before they took office but affirmed after their inaugurations. Moreover, in
two companion actions arising out of an automobile accident before he assumed office, President John
Kennedy sought temporary immunity based upon his status as Commander in Chief. However, shortly
after the district court denied stay based upon immunity, the two parties settled out of court. Id. (citing
DeVault v. Truman, 194 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1946); People ex rel. Hurley v. Roosevelt, 71 N.E. 1137
(N.Y. 1904); Hills v. Kennedy, No. 757,201 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1960); Bailey v. Kennedy, No. 757,200
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1960)).
157

444 U.S. 193 (1979).

158

'457 U.S. 731 (1982).

159

484 U.S. 219 (1988).
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According to Ferri,immunity is designed to serve the common interest by
enabling public officials to effectively execute their duties without fear of personal
liability."6 Indeed, it was this rationale upon which the Court based its decision in
Fitzgerald."' Moreover, the Court in Fitzgeraldexplained that the protected
actions must closely relate to the immunity's justifying purpose' In Fitzgerald,
the Court recognized that, because the President has such broad responsibilities,
immunity must extend to the "outer perimeter" of the President's authority."
Furthermore, the Court explained that it has traditionally performed a functional
analysis to ensure that immunity extends only to acts performed in accordance with
an official function." The Court in Forresterillustrated this truism by noting that
the absolute immunity of a judge would not extend to his actions performed in a
purely administrative capacity.'65 Hence, it is axiomatic that executive immunity
is grounded in "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor
who performed it."' 66 Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded that "[the
President's] effort to construct an immunity for unofficial acts grounded purely in
167
the identity of his office is unsupported by precedent."'
2.

The Historical Record Lacks A Common Thread

Justice Stevens continued his analysis by categorically rejecting Mr.
Clinton's reliance on the historical record to support his argument, noting that the
160

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1643 (citing Ferri,444 U.S. at 202-204).

See id. at 1644 ("Our central concern [in Fitzgerald]was to avoid rendering the President
'unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties.' [Fitzgerald,]457 U.S. at 752, n. 32."). Mr.
Clinton argued that certain dicta in Fitzgeraldindicated that the Court was equally concerned with the
effect that the President's personal vulnerability to litigation would have on his decision making
responsibilities. However, the Court rejected Mr. Clinton's argument by reiterating the underlying
rationale of the principle: "[O]ur concern was with the diversion of the President's attention during
the decision making process caused by needless worry as to the possibility of damages actions
stemming from any particular official decision." Id. at 1643-44 n.19.
161

162

See Clinton, 117 S.Ct. at 1644 (citing Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 755).

163

See id. (citing Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 757).

164

See id. (citing Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 755).

165

See id. at 1644 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988)).

166

Id. (quoting Forrester,484 U.S. at 229).

167

Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1644.
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use of such authority was unpersuasive.'6 8 Specifically, the Court considered the
writings of Thomas Jefferson, William Maclay, and Justice Story. 69 First, Mr.
Clinton had offered the writings of Jefferson to Propound the idea that a court order
subjecting the President to the judiciary's authority would jeopardize the separation
of powers.I" However, Justice Stevens was quick to point out that the Supreme
Court explicitly rebuked Jefferson's argument in Marbury v. Madison;7 ' the
Court's holding in Marbury was subsequently reaffirmed in United States v.
72

Nixon.1

Second, Mr. Clinton referred to the diary of Maclay in which John Adams
and Oliver Ellsworth reportedly stated that "'the President personally [is] not...
subject to any process whatever,' lest it be 'put ... in the power of a common
Justice to exercise any Authority over him and Stop the Whole Machine of
Government.... ."'' But this too was rejected by Justice Stevens on the grounds
that the authority did not provide adequate insight into the "unequivocal common
understanding" of the times. 74 Finally, Justice Story's comments regarding the
President's official inviolability were deficient in that they failed to define the scope
of the immunity. 75
Responding to Mr. Clinton's proffered historical evidence, Mrs. Jones
called the Court's attention to a speech given by James Wilson that directly
contradicted the proposition that the President was inviolable: "Although the
President 'is placed [on] high,' 'not a single privilege is annexed to his character;
far from being above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character as a

168

See id.

169

See id. at 1644-45.

170

See id. at n.20 (referring to 10 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 404 (P. Ford ed., 1905)).

171

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

172

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1645 n.23 (citing U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).

173

Id. at 1644-45 (quoting 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE

UNITED STATES 168 (K. Bowling & H. Veit eds., 1988)).
174

Id at 1645 n.23.

See id (referring to 3 STORY, COMMENTARIEs ON THE CONsTTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1563, 418-19 (1833) ("[B]ecause the President's 'incidental powers must include the power to
perform [his duties], without any obstruction,' he 'cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment,
or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person
must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability."')).
175
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citizen, and in his public character by impeachment.""' 76 In all, the Court concluded
other," and, therefore,
that the writings offered by both sides "largely cancel each
177
court.
the
before
discussion
the
inform
did not serve to
3.

The Judiciary Has the Authority to Rain on the King's Parade

Finally, the Court turned to what it considered Mr. Clinton's strongest
argument supporting his claim of immunity. Essentially, Mr. Clinton argued that,
given the unique character of his office, the public interest demands that the
President devote an extraordinarily large amount of his time and attention to the
execution of his duties. 8 Accordingly, the doctrine of separation of powers serves
to restrict the federal judiciary from exerting any authority over the President that
In addition, Mr. Clinton asserted that the
may interfere with his public duties.'
impose so many burdens upon the
would
case
the
present
from
arising
litigation
presidency that he would not be able to perform his duties effectively. 8 °
Furthermore, if the present action were to proceed, then the President would be
inundated with a myriad of civil cases; this too would erode the President's ability
to perform his duties.'' Thus, Mr. Clinton contended that the doctrine of separation
of powers had to be enforced to prevent an aggrandizement ofjudicial power and
a narrowing of executive power.' Mr. Clinton claimed that the authority for his
argument could be derived from Article II of the Constitution and the nation's
founding principles.'

176

Id. at 1645 (quoting 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 480 (2d ed.

1863)).

177
See id. ("'A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net
result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each side .... They
largely cancel each other."') (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952)).
178

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1645-46.

179

See id. at 1646.

18O

See id. at 1648.

181

See id.

182

See id.

183

See id. at 1645-46.
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As it had in Fitzgerald,the Supreme Court recognized the validity of Mr.
Clinton's contention that great demands are placed on the presidency because it
occupies a "unique position in the constitutional scheme." ' However, Justice
Stevens was not convinced that the Court would violate the separation of powers
by permitting the action against Mr. Clinton to proceed.'85 The Court explained that
the purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is to place certain limits on each
branch of government to ensure that one branch does not perform the duties of the
other. 6 Although the Court admitted that the lines between each branch are
sometimes blurred, it plainly stated that the judiciary was not being asked to
perform an executive function. 8 7 Rather, the Court was merely being asked to
exercise its constitutional authority to decide cases and controversies.' Hence, the
Court concluded that the litigation of matters that relate entirely to the "unofficial
conduct of the individual who happens to be the President poses no perceptible risk
of misallocation of either judicial power or executive power."' 9
The Court also sharply rebuffed Mr. Clinton's claim that greater burdens
would be placed on the President by allowing a case to proceed against him. Justice
Stevens began by reiterating that in the entire history of the United States only three
sitting Presidents had been subjected to civil process for their unofficial conduct. 9
However, because the amount of civil actions against the President have not
dramatically increased since those original actions, the Court deemed Mr. Clinton's
predictive judgment to be quite poor.' 91 Justice Stevens found an increase in civil
action against the President to be highly unlikely given the small pool of potential

18

Id., at 1647 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 732, 749 (1982)).

185

See id.

See id After citing several cases in which limits had been imposed on each branch, the court
quoted an excerpt from The Federalist:"'[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others[.]"' Id.
at 1647 n.30 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
186

187

See id. at 1647-48.

188

See id. at 1648.

189

See id.

190

See id. at 1648. See also supra note 156.

191

See Clinton, 177 S. Ct. at 1648.
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plaintiffs to which the President is exposed in his private, unofficial capacity.192
Besides, any current or future action could be sufficiently managed by the trial court
so as to occupy very little of the President's time. 93
The Court further criticized Mr. Clinton's argument by demonstrating that
any burdens that are imposed on the presidency would not be violative of the
separation of powers doctrine. The Court began by attacking the underlying
presumption of Mr. Clinton's contention. 94 Justice Stevens urged that not all
burdensome interactions between the federal judiciary and the executive branch
raise separation of powers concerns. 95 Indeed, the Court has long held that the
federal system of government "'imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping
responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of
which "would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself
effectively."' 196 Therefore, to state that the federal judiciary does not have an
97
agency in nor control over the acts of the executive branch is, at best, fallacious.
The Court continued in its disapproval of Mr. Clinton's argument by
explaining that the prerogative of the Court to encumber the President is well
established by precedent. 9 In this regard, Justice Stevens primarily relied upon the
Court's holding in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 99 to demonstrate the
extent to which the federal judiciary may interfere with the executive branch.200 In
Youngstown, the Court struck down an order issued by President Truman directing
the Secretary of Commerce to seize numerous steel mills throughout the country in
192

See id. at n.36.

193

See id. at 1648.

194
See id ("[Mr. Clinton] errs by presuming that interactions between the Judicial Branch and
the Executive ... necessarily rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the
Executive's ability to perform its constitutionally mandated functions.").
195

See id.

196

Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989)).

197
See id Once again, the Court relied on an excerpt from The Federalistfor the proposition
that the principle of separation of powers is not intended to mean that the branches "'ought to have no
partialagency in, or no controul over the acts of each other."' 1d. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47,
at 325-326 (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).

198

Id. at 1649.

199

343 U.S. 579 (1952).

200

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1649.
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order to avert a national catastrophe.2"' Justice Stevens confirmed that the Court in
Youngstown properly exercised its Article III jurisdiction in reviewing and striking
down President Truman's actions despite the fact that the inquiry compromised the
President's mission and required him to devote an exorbitant amount of time and
attention to the matter. 0 2 Thus, the federal judiciary may substantially interfere
with the executive branch without violating the separation of powers principles. 20 3
Justice Stevens further undermined Mr. Clinton's argument by describing
numerous instances in which the President had been subject to judicial process. 2 4
For instance, in UnitedStates v. Burr, °5 Chief Justice Marshall directed President
Jefferson to comply with a subpoenaduces tecum.2 Similarly, in UnitedStates v.
Nixon,217 the Supreme Court commanded President Nixon to produce the now
infamous Nixon tapes.20 Furthermore, Presidents Monroe, Grant, Ford, and Carter
have all responded to judicial orders.' 9 Even President Clinton himself has testified
in criminal proceedings on two different occasions.2 0 Therefore, given the steady
frequency with which sitting Presidents have been21subjected to judicial process,
such an occurrence could not be deemed a novelty. '
Finally, the Court concluded its examination by holding that the separation
of powers doctrine does not require federal courts to grant temporary stays of

201

See id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).

202

See id.

203

See id at 1650 ("In sum, '[i]t is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not

bar every exercise ofjurisdiction over the President of the United States.' Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 753754.").
204

See id. at 1649.

205

25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).

206

See Clinton, 117 U.S. at 1649.

207

418 U.S. 683 (1974).

208

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1649.

209

See id.

See id. (citing United States v. McDougal, 934 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Ark. 1996) and United
States v. Branscum, No. LRP-CR-96-49 (E.D. Ark., June 7, 1996)).
210

211

See id. at 1649.
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private civil actions against the President.2 2 Although the court recognized that the
President might become preoccupied by pending litigation,' it reasoned that the
burdens imposed by such litigation are no greater than those faced by the President
everyday; certainly, they do not "ordinarily implicate constitutional separation of
powers concerns."2 4 Justice Stevens succinctly summarized his incisive analysis
as follows:
If the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by
reviewing the legality of the President's official conduct, and if it
may direct appropriate process to the President himself, it must
follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality
of his unofficial conduct. The burden on the President's time and
energy that is a mere by-product of such review surely cannot be
considered as onerous as the direct burden imposed by judicial
review and the occasional invalidation of his official actions.2" 5
B.

Question Two: Can the CourtEstablish a Clothing-FreeArea?

Upon addressing the second question presented in the petition, Justice
Stevens urged that the same reasoning used to deny immunity should be applied to
Mr. Clinton's claim that a stay should be granted "in all but the most exceptional
cases."216 Indeed, the Supreme Court found it peculiar to assert that the Framers of
the Constitution intended to protect the President from unnecessary private
litigation, yet provided no implementing mandates.' 7 This lack of Constitutional
direction convinced the Court that the determination of whether a specific case
should receive exceptional treatment is a matter of judicial, rather than

212

See id. at 1650.

See id. at n.40 ("There is, no doubt, some truth to Learned Hand's comment that a lawsuit
should be 'dread[ed] ...beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death.' 3 ASSOCIATION
213

OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LECTURE ON LEGAL Topics 105 (1926).").
214

Id.

215

Id. at 1650 (footnotes omitted).

216

See id. (quoting Petitioner's Brief I).

217

See id.
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constitutional, concern. 18 Therefore, the Court turned to an examination of whether
the district court's decision to stay trial was an abuse of its discretion.2"
The Court began its analysis by rejecting the notion that the district court's
decision to stay trial was the "functional equivalent" of a grant of temporary
immunity.22 Justice Stevens pointed out that, pursuant to its power to control its
own docket, a trial court has broad discretion in the scheduling of court
proceedings, including the authority to stay cases.22' In fact, the Court went so far
as to say that, in the present case, potential burdens on the President resulting from
the Court's exercise of authority over the executive branch could justify a stay of
trial.' In addition, Justice Stevens advised that trial courts should manage cases
involving the President in accordance with the "high respect that is owed to the
office of the Chief Executive."' m However, the Court also recognized that the onus
is on the President to demonstrate a need for a stay of trial. 4 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the district court had not only abused its discretion by granting a stay
of trial,' but that its decision was premature in that Mr. Clinton had not established
a need. 26
218

See id.

219

See id.

220

See id.(quoting Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1361 n.9 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 116

S. Ct. 2545 (1996), affd and remd, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997), 974 F. Supp. 112 (1997)). The Court
noted that, technically speaking, the district court's decision to stay trial was not the "functional
equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity because discovery was allowed to continue. Id.
221

M

See id.
See id.

2M

Id. at 1650-51.

224

See id.at 1651. In other words, the civil proceedings must impinge upon or interfere with

the President's execution of his constitutional duties. Id.
225

See id. Justice Stevens believed that the district court had abused its discretion because it

did not take into account the plaintiff s interest in bringing the case to trial. In so holding, the Court
gave no weight to the district court's conclusion that the plaintiff was in no hurry to try her case
because she had waited so long to file the complaint. Instead, the Court cautioned that a stay of trial
would "increase the danger of prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence, including the inability of
witnesses to recall specific facts, or the possible death of a party." Id.
226

See id. ("Other than the fact that a trial may consume some of the President's time and

attention, there is nothing in the record to enable ajudge to assess the potential harm that may ensue
from scheduling the trial promptly after discovery is concluded.").
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C.

Disposition of the Case:Hanging the King Out to Dry

The Court ended its analysis by commenting on two issues included in Mr.
Clinton's brief. First, Mr. Clinton had maintained that by allowing a civil action to
proceed against him, a deluge of politically motivated, harassing, and frivolous
litigation would follow? 7 The Court dismissed Mr. Clinton's claim by stating that
the judicial system was designed to eliminate such vexatious litigation, that the
availability of sanctions would deter many from pursuing pesky civil actions, and
that history had already proven his underlying premise wrong. 8 Next, Mr. Clinton
had urged that the national security might be threatened if he were to be subjected
to civil process. 9 To this the Court retorted that even though the judicial system
had always given 'the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities,"' it would
take an act of Congress to afford the President stronger protection? 0o Hence, the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, thereby affording
Mrs. Jones the right of all citizens - the right to an orderly disposition of her
claims.u2
D.

The Concurrence:Reviving the King's ConstitutionalTailors

In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer agreed with both the majority and
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in the proposition that the President cannot
expect the courts to postpone private civil actions against him without
demonstrating a need.23 2 However, in Justice Breyer's view, once the President has
established that a conflict exists between the judicial proceedings and his official
actions, then the Judiciary is constitutionally forbidden from interfering with the
discharge of the President's official duties.23 3 Although Justice Breyer
acknowledged that such a situation had not yet arisen in the Clinton case, the Justice

227

See id.

See id The Court explained that past Presidents had been subjected to civil litigation before
without incurring an increase in claims filed against them. See id.
228

229

See id.

230

See id. at 1651-52 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).

231

See id. at 1652.

232

See id. at 1652 (Breyer, J., concurring).

233

See id.
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felt compelled to announce the23 4constitutional principle for "fear that to disregard
it now may appear to deny it."
Apparently, Justice Breyer was persuaded by Mr. Clinton's use of historical
evidence. Specifically, the Justice construed Justice Story's Commentaries to mean
that Article II of the Constitution affords an "'official inviolability' to the President
'while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office,' and that this inviolability
must be broad enough the permit him 'to perform' his official duties without
'obstruction or impediment."'23 5 Moreover, with regard to Maclay's conflicting
views with Adams and Ellsworth, Justice Breyer dismissed the majority's
conclusion (that the rhetoric largely cancel each other) by asserting that Maclay was
simply "not an important political figure . .,2.6
Furthermore, the Justice was
convinced that the writings of Thomas Jefferson should serve to instruct the Court
23 7
on the issue of executive immunity.
Turning to precedent, Justice Breyer argued that the fact that a few
Presidents have voluntarily acted in accordance with court orders did not inform the
discussion regarding what the Constitution commands? 8 Furthermore, the
enforcement of subpoenas seeking documents from a sitting President for use in a
criminal case amounted to only a simple search of documents, rather than a direct
interference with the President's time.23 9 Instead, the Justice urged that the logic
and rationale of Fitzgeraldshould be extended to include absolute immunity from
private suits when such actions would distract from the President's time and
energy.2 4° In Justice Breyer's final analysis, ordinary case-management principles
are insufficient to deal with the demands a civil action would impose on the
President's time; therefore, a constitutionally-based principle must be recognized
to require district courts to "schedule proceedings so as to avoid significant
interference with the President's ongoing discharge of his official
234

See id.

235

Id. at 1654. See supra note 175, for the full text of Justice Story's quote.

236

See id. at 1655.

237

See id.

238

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1656.

See id. Justice Breyer also dismissed the majority's use of Youngstown stating that the case
was irrelevant because it dealt with the official conduct of the President; therefore, any judicial
interference with the President simply served to define, determine, or clarify the legal scope of an
official duty. See id.
239

240

See id.
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responsibilities."2 4' Yet, because Mr. Clinton did not demonstrate significant
interference, Justice Breyer agreed that the district court's decision to grant a stay
was premature.242
V. ANALYSIS

In Nixon v. Fitzgerald,the United States Supreme Court was quite adamant
in holding that the President of the United States is absolutely immune from civil
actions arising out of conduct that is within the "outer perimeter" of his official
duties.243 There can be no dispute that the Court in Fitzgeraldwas correct in stating
that such litigation "could distract a President from his public duties, to the
detriment of not only the President and his office but also the nation that the
presidency was designed to serve." 24 However, the Court's holding in Nixon was
limited to the official acts of the President. 4 Therefore, the Supreme Court's
decision in Clinton v. Jones not to extend the rationale of Fitzgeraldwas an
appropriate exercise of its constitutional authority and a proper application of the
separation of powers doctrine.
A.

PresumptiveAmenability

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Supreme Court's decision in
Clinton is that the Court applied a separation of powers analysis that was different
from that applied by the FitzgeraldCourt. Instead of using the "balancing test"

241

Id. at 1659.

242

See id.

243

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).

244

Id. at 753.

This is evident from the Court's notation that "[t]hese dangers are significant even though
there is no historical record of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal officials
for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until [recently]." Id. at 753 n.33
(1982). The Court in Clinton used this quote to demonstrate that the Court's holding in Fitzgeraldwas
limited to the official acts of the President; there always have been numerous causes of actions
available to potential plaintiffs against any defendant, including the President. See Clinton v. Jones,
117 S. Ct. 1636, 1648 n.36 (1997).
245

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1997

35

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 10
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:493

applied by the Court in Fitzgerald,2" the Court in Clinton recognized the raw
authority of the judiciary to "severely burden" the Presidency!4 7 By relegating the
Fitzgerald "balancing test" to a mere exercise of judicial discretion, and by
reaffirming the Supreme Court's prerogative to review the acts of the President, the
Court in Clinton reinforced the principle of judicial review and strengthened the
power of the federal judiciary.
The Court in Clinton made it clear that the exercise of its constitutional
authority to decide cases and controversies in no way encroaches upon the
executive power of the Presidency.248 Thus, when considering the private acts of the
President, the separation of powers structure on which presidential immunity is
dependent collapses into a mere balancing of public policy interests.2 49 In fact,
some commentators suggest that even Nixon v. Fitzgerald was lean on
constitutionality and fat on policy." As explained by Judge Wright at the district
court level, Rule 40 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedurepermits a court to
schedule judicial proceedings "as the courts deem expedient." '' This judicial
control enables federal judges to "engage in the type of public policy analysis
conducted by the Fitzgerald majority and still deliberate on the equities of
individual cases without squeezing out of the Constitution 'law where none
exists."' 2 Therefore, the Court in Clinton effectively recognized that the President
is presumptively amenable to civil liability for conduct taken in his private capacity.
To overcome this presumption, the President must demonstrate that the interests of

246

Traditionally, before the judiciary could exercise authority over the President, the court was

required to "balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of
intrusion on the authority and functions of the executive branch." Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 731, 754.
247

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1650 (relying on the Court's use ofjudicial review in Youngstown

Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
248

See id. at 1647.

249

See Allen, supranote 95, at 585. Professor Allen goes on to point out that "[i]f the absolute

immunity of the President is so firmly rooted in the separation of powers doctrine as the protector of
executive functioning, it seems both bizarre and illogical that the coordinate branch of Congress could
alter the balance of powers." Id. at 576.
250

See id. at 604.

See Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D. Ark. 1994), affd in part,rev'd in part,
72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.granted,116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996) affidandrem 'd, 117 S. Ct. 1636
(1997), 974 F. Supp. 712 (1997).
251

252

See Allen, supra note 95, at 608.
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the public outweigh the plaintiff's right to a remedy? 3 Unfortunately for Mr.
Clinton, he had not shown at the district court level that the public interest
outweighed Mrs. Jones's right to a legal remedy for constitutional violations."5
B.

Defining the Scope of the Outer-perimeterof PresidentialDuty

The Supreme Court's decision in Clinton clearly and unequivocally
demonstrates that the President and the presidency are indeed severable. Moreover,
the Court's holding in Clinton fmnly establishes that the office of the president is
no longer "clothe[d] ...with sovereign immunity, placing it beyond the law." 5
In decisions preceding Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court had demonstrated its
willingness to remove the cloak of executive immunity when federal officials
violated the Constitution256 In Butz v. Economou, for example, the Supreme Court

To offer an example, assume the injured motorist had pressed his claim against
President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Having the President put
Premier Kruschev on hold to testify whether the light was red or green simply
makes no sense. One litigant's desire for immediate relief would take a back seat
to the immediate interests of the nation at large.
Allen, supranote 95, at 764.
253

254

See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1651.
In this case, at the stage at which the District Court made its ruling, there was no
way to assess whether a stay of triai after the completion of discovery would be
warranted. Other than the fact that a trial may consume some of the President's
time and attention, there is nothing in the record to enable a judge to assess the
potential harm that may ensue from scheduling the trial promptly after discovery
is concluded. We think the District Court may have given undue weight to the
concern that a trial might generate unrelated civil actions that could conceivably
hamper the President in conducting the duties of his office. If and when that
should occur, the court's discretion would permit it to manage those actions in
such fashion (including deferral of trial) that interference with the President's
duties would not occur. But no such impingement upon the President's conduct
of his office was shown here.

Id.
255

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 767 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).

See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971) (holding that governmental officials may be liable for violating the constitutional
rights of individuals even though the officials were acting in their official capacity). See also Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (stating that an official loses his executive immunity when he
knowingly violates the Constitution); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (recognizing that state
Governors do not have absolute immunity even during a perceived state of emergency); Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that the President is not immune from
liability for violating the Constitution unless he reasonably believes that his actions are lawful), affd,
256
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stated that once an executive official violates the Constitution, he exceeds the scope
of his constitutional authority and, therefore, no longer qualifies for absolute
immunity protection. 7 The Court in Butz did recognize, though, that "there are
some officials whose special functions require a full exemption from liability."" 8
However, the Court later curtailed this protection for constitutional violations when
5
it affirmed, per curiam,the holding of Halperinv. Kissinger."
In Halperin,the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
President could assert an absolute immunity defense for constitutional violations
only if he could identify an implied constitutional exemption or demonstrate
"drastically adverse" public policy consequences.260 Because the President is
solemnly sworn to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States,"'" it is axiomatic that a constitutional violation cannot be within the "outer
perimeter" of the President's duties.262 Therefore, the Court's holding in Halperin
provides significant precedential value.263 Now, after Clinton, with the
reaffirmation of strict judicial review coupled with the Court's functional approach
to separation of powers issues, future courts are armed with the necessary analytical
tools to weave the delicate contours of executive immunity so as to ensure that the
"outer perimeter" of presidential authority is not construed to include egregious
264
constitutional violations.

452 U.S. 713 (1981) (plurality opinion).
257

See Butz, 438 U.S. at 495.

258

See id. at 508.

259

606 F.2d 1192, 1208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1979), affd, 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (plurality opinion).

260

See id. at 1210-11.

261

U.S. CONST. art.

262

See Walton, supra note 4, at 941.

263

Id.

264

The impact of the Supreme Court's decision on state courts, however, is less certain.

II, § 1, cl.

8.

Pursuant to the doctrine of avoidance, the court did not address whether concerns about federalism,
comity, and local prejudice would present a more compelling case for immunity if the case were
brought in a state tribunal. Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1642 (1997). Therefore, the Court in
Clinton provided no dicta on these issues.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss2/10

38

Sears: Clinton v. Jones: The King Has No Clothes (Nor Absolute Immunity

19971
C.

CLINTON v. JONES

The Moral Imperative of PresidentialAccountability

One of the most recognized and widely repeated arguments in the public
debate over the President's assertion of temporary immunity is the public's interest
in protecting the dignity of the office of the president 65 Certainly, Mr. Clinton
embraced the contention that the influence and effectiveness of the Chief Executive
would be greatly diminished, both domestically and abroad, by requiring the
President to defend a suit for civil damages 66 However, in so arguing, supporters
of Mr. Clinton unwittingly provide what is perhaps the strongest argument in
support of subjecting the President to civil liability for his unofficial, private
conduct.
The Supreme Court has oft repeated that the Chief Executive "occupies a
unique position in the constitutional scheme ...,267 Despite the Framers' attempt
to avoid the creation of a monarch, in many respects "'the office of the [p]resident
really is the office of a King[.]"' 268 After all, he is the central figure in the
constitutional structure; he presides over the most powerful country; and he is the
leader of the free world. But much more than this, the office of the president
occupies a "unique position of moral authority in the nation and in the world."269
Therefore, there is a strong public interest in ensuring that the individual selected
to occupy the Oval Office is of sufficient moral mettle to provide that moral
leadership.

265

A few newspaper excerpts serve to illustrate this point: "The chief argument for settlement

- especially among Clinton's supporters - is that such a lurid trial would demean the dignity of the
office of the president." DraggingDown the Presidency,INv. Bus. DAILY, May 30, 1997, at A24.
But to see the office of the president dragged through the mud like this, to watch
the dignity of the presidency besmirched in such a scandalous way, is unsettling.
There have been some pretty widely detested presidents in my time, but at their
darkest moments, Johnson and Nixon never had to endure such intimate scrutiny
of their personal behavior.
Joe Dirck, The PresidencyMired in Mud, PLAIN DEALER (CLEV.), June 3, 1997, at lB.
266

See Motion to Dismiss, Jones v. Clinton (Civil Action No. LR-C-94-290) (E.D. Ark. Aug.

10, 1994) cited in Allen, supra note 95, at 598.
267

Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 749-51.

268

Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 694 n.2 (quoting RussEL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 427-

28 (1974)).
269

Allen, supra note 95, at 598.
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When the allegations against the President are as "titillating and
2 7 as they are in Clinton, then the claim must be adjudicated on the
degrading""
merits of the case rather than granting temporary immunity?7 The public's interest
must be satisfied especially when the allegations involve the violation of a citizen's
constitutionally protected rights.2" If the claim against the President is without
merit, then the case will be efficiently disposed of on summary judgment? 7 On the
270

Motion to Dismiss, supra note 266.

271

Allen, supra note 95, at 597.

272

Id.

273

Ultimately, the district court did, in fact, dispose of Mrs. Jones's case on summary judgment.

Upon remand, Mr. Clinton moved the district court to dispose of the case under Rule 12(c) of the
FederalRules of CivilProcedure. Jones v. Clinton, 974 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Ark. 1997). Judge Susan
Weber Wright granted Mr. Clinton's motion in part and denied it in part. Id. Pursuant to that ruling,
the following claims were dismissed: (1) the defamation claim because, under Arkansas law, statements
made prior to a lawsuit regarding possible litigation by either the attorney or the parties to the litigation
are absolutely privileged, see id at 730; (2) the § 1983 deprivation of substantive due process right to
bodily integrity claim because Mrs. Jones's allegations did not support such a claim, see id. at 724; (3)
the § 1983 deprivation of a due process property interest in employment claim because Arkansas state
employees generally do not have such an interest, see id. at 725-27; (4) the § 1983 deprivation of a due
process liberty interest in reputation claim because the alleged defamatory statements were not made
during the course of termination of employment nor did the alleged statements foreclose any
employment opportunities to Mrs. Jones, see id. at 727; (5) the § 1983 deprivation of protected liberty
interest claim arising from false imprisonment because the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that false imprisonment is not actionable under § 1983, see id. at 728 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137 (1979)).
On April 1, 1998, responding to yet another motion for summary judgment (this time
couched in Rule 56 of the FederalRules of CivilProcedure), Judge Wright disposed of the following
remaining claims: (1) the § 1983 quid pro quo sexual harassment claim because the allegations
described nothing more than "mere inconvenience" and "minor or de minimis personnel matters," and
did not result in a tangible job detriment or adverse employment action, see Jones v. Clinton, No. LRC-94-290, 1998 WL 148370, at *13 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 1, 1998); (2) the § 1983 hostile work environment
sexual harassment claim because the conduct to which Mrs. Jones was subjected, although "boorish
and offensive," id. at *16, was not pervasive, intimidating, or abusive enough to establish such a claim,
nor were the defendant's actions sustained or non trivial, see id, at * 15; (3) the § 1985 conspiracy claim
because a conspiracy cannot exist where there has been no underlying violation of federal law, see id.
at * 16; and (4) the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the allegations did not
satisfy the "rigorous standards" of an Arkansas claim of outrage, see id. at *19, and because the
allegations described "a mere sexual proposition or encounter... that was relatively brief in duration,
did not involve any coercion or threats of reprisal, and was abandoned as soon as [Mrs. Jones] made
it clear that the advance was not welcome," id. at * 17.
After being convinced by his attorney that the District Court's decision to throw out Mrs.
Jones's lawsuit against him was not an April Fools' joke, "an uninhibited Clinton celebrated the news
in his hotel room by chewing a cigar and beating on an African drum." John F. Harris, White House
FeelingRelieved, Resentful, But Clinton Drums Home HisJubilation,THE WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1998,
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other hand, if the claim is valid, then a fully-informed electorate must have
sufficient opportunity to assess fully the moral authority of its President and act
appropriately either at the ballot box or through impeachment. 4 In a constitutional
at A16. On April 16, 1998, though, Mrs. Jones announced that she was going to appeal the District
Court's decision:
As you know, two weeks ago the court in Little Rock surprisingly dismissed my
case.... I was shocked because I believe that what Mr. Clinton did to me was
wrong and that the law protects women who are subjected to that kind of abuse of
power.... Despite the continuing personal strain on my family and me, in the end
I have not come this far to see the law let men who have done such things dodge
their responsibility. They should not be able to abuse their positions of power at
the expense of female employees. And I do not believe, when this suit is over,
that my case will merely show that people in power can get away....
I am
confident that the [Eighth] Circuit Court will rule that my case should be heard by
ajury. That is all I ever sought, and I will continue to seek that simple right.
Jones Wants "JusticeandMy Day in Court",THE WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1998, A18.
274

In an effort to establish a pattern and practice of sexual misconduct, Mrs. Jones's attorneys
deposed several women regarding their sexual relationships with Mr. Clinton. The revelations which
arose out of those depositions and the subsequent behind-the-scene maneuvering gave the American
public the opportunity to assess Mr. Clinton's moral character and ultimately threatened to imperil his
entire presidency. See Dan Balz, The PoliticalImplications,PresidentImperiled as Never Before, THE
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1998, A13. For instance, after it was made public that Mr. Clinton had allegedly
urged a former White House intern, Monica Lewinski, to lie to Mrs. Jones's attorneys about a sexual
relationship between Ms. Lewinski and the President, independent counsel Kenneth Starr expanded
the scope of his investigation of Mr. Clinton to include allegations of suborning perjury, making false
statements, and obstructing justice. Susan Schmidt et al., ClintonAccused of UrgingAide to Lie, Starr
ProbesWhether PresidentTold Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to Jones's Lawyers, THE WASH. POST,
Jan. 21, 1998, Al.
Although Mr. Clinton's public approval ratings soared immediately following the break of
the Lewinski scandal, see, e.g., Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, President'sPopularityHits a High,
Majorityin Poll Say PoliticalEnemiesAre Out to Get Him, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1998, A1, former
White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta suggested that President Clinton should resign if the
allegations were true. Peter Baker, Panetta'sCandidAdvice From Afar Has White House Annoyed,
THE WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1998, A8. Furthermore, traditional supporters, such as Patricia Ireland,
president of the National Organization of Women, spoke out against the President after former White
House Aide Kathleen Willey came forward with accusations that Mr. Clinton had "groped" her when
she met with him concerning an employment opportunity: "This is not just sexual harassment. If it's
true, it's sexual assault .... He put his hand on her breast, he put her hand on his erection. That is
a pretty serious charge if true and it is a very big problem." Peter Baker, Willey Describes Clinton
Advance, President'sDenialIs Lie, Ex-Aide Says on TV, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1998, Al.
In March 1998, Congress allocated $1.3 million to prepare for possible impeachment
proceedings against President Clinton for conduct arising out of the Paula Jones lawsuit. See Juliet
Eilperin, FirstSkirmishes in Hill Impeachment War, Democrats Express Outrage Over $1.3 Million
Allocation, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1998, A12. Never before had the President of the United States
been subjected to such scrutiny of his personal life; and never before had the ethical, political, and
social need for subjecting the President to civil liability for his unofficial conduct been so aptly
demonstrated:
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democracy, the power of the people over the Chief Executive is the most important
check against despotism.27 The great American writer John Steinbeck succinctly
described this unique relationship between the public and its President:
The President must be greater than anyone else, but not better than
anyone else... . A [p]residential slip of the tongue, a slight error
in judgment - social, political, or ethical - can raise a storm of
protest .... And with all this, Americans have a love for the

President that goes beyond loyalty or party nationality; he is ours,
and we exercise the right to destroy him.276
VI. CONCLUSION

In Clinton v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court declared that, in
America, the King is dead. Not only did the Court recognize the naked violability

of the President in his private, unofficial conduct, but it allowed a mere citizen to
cry out, "The President has no clothes!" Long ago, the Supreme Court warned,

"The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government
of laws, and not of men[;] [i]t will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation
if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." 77 Although
the office of the president constitutes the apex of the nation's polity and is,

There are a great many laws on the books of this country, many of them onerous
and some of them odious. Nevertheless, we are all required to obey them all. You
have to tell the truth under oath, and so does the [P]resident. You may not
conspire to obstruct justice, and neither may the [P]resident. You must not paw
women who come to you seeking employment, and so too must not the
[P]resident. To excuse the head of government from the laws that govern the rest
of us is not to tolerate one man's peccadilloes; it is to tolerate the corruption of
democracy.
Michael Kelly, Making Liars of Us All, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1998, A21.
275

"A prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant is unfit to

be the ruler of a people." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 22 (U.S. 1776).
276

JOHN STEINBECK,

AMERICA AND AMERICANs 46 (1966) cited in Long, supra note 97, at 283

n. 1.
Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 696 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803)), aff'd inpart,rev'd in part,72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct.2545 (1996), affdandrem'd,117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
277
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therefore, afforded great respect and deference, the President is a mere creature of
the Constitution. 8
The President of the United States may be the first of citizens, but it must
be remembered that he is still just a citizen; he may be considered the first of men,
but he is, nevertheless, merely a man? 79 The remedies of impeachment and reelection afforded by the Constitution serve solely as "political safety valves;" they
do not provide relief for individual harms.28 Certainly, the President, "'keeping

within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of
inquiry in a civil suit for damages.""'28 But where, as a consequence of his private,
unofficial conduct, the President causes injury, the Constitution commands that the
aggrieved party be granted relief and that the President be held accountable for his

actions.282 In responding to the Supreme Court's decision in UnitedStates v. Burr,
President Jefferson queried: "'[T]he Constitution enjoins [the President's] constant

agency in the concerns of millions of people[;]'... 'is the law paramount to this,
which calls on him on behalf of a single one?""'2 3 For Chief Justice Marshall in

Marbury and now for the Court in Clinton, the answer - quite simply - is yes.284

ChristopherJames Sears*

278

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 798 n.1 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).

279

Compare Walton, supra note 4, at 905. See also note 25 and accompanying text.

280

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 797 (1982) (Burger, J., concurring).

281

Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 745.

See Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 347, 349-350 (1868) ("[H]owever, that where
an officer is required by law to perform an act, not of this political or executive character, which affects
the private rights of individuals, he is to that extent amenable to the courts.") cited in Walton, supra
note 4, at 931.
282

Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1649 n.38 (1997) (quoting 10 WORKS
JEFFERSON 404 (P. Ford ed., 1905)).
283
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Id. at 1649 n.38.
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